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Introduction 
Periodic shortages of rail equipment have freqnetly imposed marketing 
problems and costs upon the grain industry. For exumple, one study 
estimated the total cost due to the lack of transportation equipment 
was $2.36 million dollars for Iowa elevators in 1969. 1 In spite of efforts 
to resolve the equipment problem through the private sector, these costs 
have persisted and led to attempts to seek relief through government 
intervention. 
During the 1980 legislative session, the South Dakota Governor suggested 
a new approach; the purchase of rail cars by the State to supplement rail-
road and elevator fleets. South Dakota is not alone in examining the 
purchase of rail cars. The Highway and Transportation Department in 
ilichigan has made a similar proposal. North Dakota recently concluded 
a feasibility study which explored the same alternative. And during 
October, 1979, the Province of Saskatchewan ordered 1000 covered hopper 
rail cars. 
The purchase of rail cars by a State to relieve equipment shortaqes 
is a new approach. But when past attempts to resolve a problem have rc1iled, 
public officials may be forced to venture into uncharted waters. This 
report is an attempt to assist decision makers in evaluating the probable 
success of this policy alternative. 
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First, the history and causes of rail car shortayes will be addressed 
followed by an evaluation of the profitability of rail car ownership. 
Thirdly, the problems of managing a public rail car fleet will be explored. 
The fourth section includes a discussion of the long-term impacts that 
State provision of rail cars would have upon the supply of equipment 
available to move grain. This will be achieved by analyzing the economic 
incentives which motivate railroad and shipper investment in rolling 
stock. The long-term involves a period long enough for the railrouds 
and shippers to make major changes in investment and disinvestment policies. 
This paper concludes with an explanation of some alternatives available 
to public officials that could effectively relieve the shortage by 
modifying supply and demand for rail cars. An appendix is included which 
briefly applies public good theory to the provision of rail cars. 
of the Rail Car 
i'1hile the "investigation of the reasons for seasonal rail car 
shortages" is often included in current lists of critical transportation 
issues to be addressed, the problem is not of recent origin. The very 
first case heard before the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) "involved 
a complaint by the North Dakota Board of Railroad Corr:rnissioners against 
th~ Northern Pacific Railway for failing to provide adequate car service 
to North Dakota shippers. 11 2 Again, "as early as 1907 the Commission held 
extensive hearings on freight car shortages, receiving testimony from 
shippers of grain, coal, and lumber on their inability to obtain freight 
cars in sufficient numbers at the time requested."3 In the fall of 1921, 
the Joint Corrunission of Agricultural Inquiry, created by a Senate Resolution, 
found that "the supply of box cars, coal cars, stock cars, and refrigerator 
cars is inadequate to meet the demand during normal periods of activity 
3 
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and should be rapidly augmented." In 1953, \villiam Hudson found that 
a tight boxcar situation with periodic shortages, particularly of the 
better class of equipment required for grain and grain products, will probably 
c: 
continue over the next several years.":) In spite of this attention, the 
carrier car shortage problem continues and elevators have started acquiring 
private fleets in order to reach rail based markets. 
No single factor can be identified as the primary contributor to this 
continuing shortage of railcars. Rather, it has resulted from the interaction 
of numerous economic and non-economic incentives over time. Following are 
nine factors which have and continue to contribute to the shortage: 
First, the railroads have failed to share in general periods of 
economic prosperity. They have earned an average of about 2~ percent return 
on investment between 1964 and 1979, and during the last 5 years the return 
has averaged 1.6 percent. 6 Railroad earnings are not sufficient to meet 
all their capital requirement. The low rate of return discourages reinvesting 
railroad earnings back into the railroad and also fails to attract outside 
capital. 
A second factor contributing to the rail car shortage is the seasonal 
production pattern of grain combined with year-to-year variation in foreign 
demand. This creates shortages and surpluses of rail equipment over time. 
The result is that "carriers may invest in capacity that is under-utilized 
during off-peak periods or use existing capacity so intensively that costs 
increase in greater proportion than output. 117 These changes in demand 
over time can be compounded by agricultural production practices. For 
example, the technological development and adaptation of the picker sheller 
and corn dryer increased, from 29 to 59 percent, the amount of corn moving 
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directly to the Iowa elevator duri~0 harvest. 8 Increases in farm 
storage capacity also provided farmers with the ability to alter historicc1l 
marketing patterns. This creates surges in grain movements in response 
to changes in grain demand rather than the predictable pattern of grain 
production. 
A third factor contributing to the equipment shortage is the decrease 
in car utilization over time.9 Railroads and shippers are constantly 
striving to reduce labor requirements while providing greater protection 
for cargo. The result has been the demise of the plain, 40 foot, narrow 
door boxcar. It has been replaced by cars specifically designed and 
equipped to meet the requirements of individual commodities. However, 
this has resulted in an inflexible car fleet which cannot serve multiple 
uses as transportation demands change. Therefore the percent of loaded 
miles has decreased from 67 percent of total miles in 1946 to 57.9 percent 
in 1979. 
Fourth, rail rates remain stable throughout the year, failing to 
reflect the seasonality of grain production or to allocate demand over 
time. While the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 
(RRRR Act) addressed this issue by instructing the Interstate Commerce 
Commission "to provide sufficient incentive to shippers to reduce peak-
period shipments, 1110 seasonal rates were not widely adopted and the 
provision was repealed in 1980. 
Fifth, the "Economics of Forced Compensation" is the title Tosterud 
and Nelson11 have applied to the neqative incentive provided by existing 
per diem rates. Per diem rates are the fees paid by one railroad to 
another for using rail cars and are established by the American Association 
of Railroad (AAR) and the ICC. Historically they have been maintained at 
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a level which is below cost to the railroad owning the car. The low 
level of per diem fees continues primarily through the efforts of 
those railroads whose total car usage is greater than their ownership. 
These carriers are located within territories which terminate more 
interregional carloads than are originated. Historically, these have 
been the eastern roads. The western roads, including those serving 
South Dakota, are forced to interline carloads of traffic with eastern 
carriers, and rather than invest in cars to meet their needs, the deficit 
carriers simply keep the cars and use them as long as they are needed. 
During periods of car surpluses, cars are returned to the owning carrier 
empty, while westbound loads are loaded in the cars owned by the deficit 
carriers. In addition to an increase in empty miles, which use additional 
resources, this practice also places a disproportionate share of the 
cost of the car surplus upon railroads having an adequate car supply. 
Grun field su:mn1arized the impact of the per diem incentive, 1 2 
(a) a per diem rate which was less than prospective daily 
ownership costs of a new freight car would lead to an overall 
deficiency in freight car ownership; (b) a single per diem rate 
would discourage the purchase of the more expensive freight cars 
with their greater annual depreciation expensel3; and (c) a 
seasonally inflexible per diem rate would fail to equate freight 
car demand with opportunity costs during peak and off-peak periods. 
The sixth factor is that the existing demurrage charges make rail cars 
economical storage alternatives during periods of storage stress. Demurrage 
is the fee shippers and receivers pay for holding a rail car beyond the 
normal time necessary for loading or unloading. ~lhile the d;::iily demurrage 
rate increases with time, elevators which are filled becc1use of heavy grain 
movement still find rail cars an economical storage alternative. Unfortunately, 
this inefficient use of grain cars normally occurs during harvest periods 
when car shortages often are greatest. 
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Another factor is that the ICC is charged with the responsibility of 
protecting the public interest and must decide between the interests of 
large and small shippers. Large elevators, capable of shipping unit 
trains, use rail cars much more efficently than smaller elevators. According 
to an Iowa study, the movement of grain in unit trains requires only 28 
percent of the number of cars that would be needed to transport the 
grain in single car movements. 14 Thus the ICC is charged with choosing 
between efficiency and equity. A recent policy limited the percentage 
of cars used in unit trains, protecting the interests of the smaller and 
branchline elevators while reducing the total amount of grain which is 
moved. In August 1980 the responsibility for car service was shifted to 
the A.AR. Renewed emphasis on efficiency will likely lead to policies 
improving car utilization to the detriment of smaller shippers. 
An eighth factor is the limited capacity of American rail car 
builders. Over the past decade, purchasers have faced order backlogs 
which have delayed delivery of grain cars for many months. This backlog 
limits the ability of railroads or elevators to respond quickly to 
changes in demand and it also means public purchases will delay private 
purchases. 
The Economics of Public Car Ownership 
The ninth and most important factor contributing to the r;;iil cur 
shortage is the fact that owning or leasing railcars is unprofitable for 
either elevators or railroads. Both need cars to operate, but neither 
want to own their own. Rather, they prefer that someone else own the 
required equipment and allow them to use it. If owning rail cars were 
profitable, railroads would be buying cars, rather than reducing 
investment as they have in the past. During the last ten years, for 
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example, class one railroads reduced their car capacity ownership by 
over 20,000 cars per year.15 The argument can also be extended to shippers 
who would gladly purchase cars if they were a good investment, but 
shippers have also been reluctant investors. \Jhile shipper-owned or 
leased cars increased by over 6,400 units per year between 1969 and 197916 
they were not purchased as an investment but rather as a necessary cost 
of doing business. Rail markets often pay more than truck markets and 
elevators need rail cars to receive the higher bid. Since railroads do 
not provide enough rail cars the elevators have had to acquire their own. 
They lose money on their private fleets but the higher price received for 
the grain offsets the loss and their total income is increased. 
The specific profitability of owning rail cars is developed in Table 
1. The major variables are turnaround time, car cost, and mileage credits. 
Turnaround is the number of trips a car makes each month and is usually 
higher if the car is in a unit train. Car costs can be estimated either 
through a lease or purchase price. Since both methods are used extensively 
by shippers and an active lease market exists, theory suggests that either 
lease prices or purchase prices would provide adequate estimates for car 
costs. Mileage credits are the fees paid by railroads to shippers when 
shippers use their own car. The early 1980 rate was 24 cents per loaded 
mile for covered hopper cars. Table 1 reveals that car lease payments 
exceed mileage earnings for all reasonable assumptions. Historically, 
rail car investments have not been profitable for carriers or shippers. 
All figures in Table 1 represent actual turnaround experienced by private 
shippers. 
It must be stressed that State-owned or leased cars would also incur 
a deficit. Thus, not only would the State incur the initial cost but the 
rail fleet would require continuing operating support. 
8 
These nine factors have inter~cted with others not identified to 
create an environment which has discoraged the railroads and elevators 
from purchasing grain cars. In fact, between 1960 and 1979 the railroads 
have actually reduced their ownership of cars capable of carrying grain. 17 
Table 1. Cost of Monthly Rail Car Ownership 
Assume: 
Cost of 
Lease per 
Month 
$570 
570 
570 
570 
576 
604 
580 
640 
640 
(1) A 15 year lease signed during the first quarter of 
1980. A likely lease rate would include a monthly 
payment $570 and an annual charge of $0.02 for each 
mile over 30,000. This rate is subject to increases 
as Daintenance costs increase. 
(2) Railroads pay $0.24 per loaded Dile for privately leased 
or owned covered hoppers during early 1980. 
(3) These figures represent 100 percent utilization, 12 
months per year. Costs increase rapidly if the cars 
are idle. 
Number of Loads 
Per Month 
l 
2* 
3 
300 Mi 
Monthly 
Mileage Credit 
Earned 
$ 72 
144 
216 
700 Mile One l·Jay Trip 
l* 
2** 
3 
168 
336 
504 
1500 i-1ile One \·lay Trip 
l 
1. 66*** 
2**** 
360 
600 
525***** 
Profit or (Loss} 
Per Car 
Per Month 
$(498) 
( 426) 
(354) 
(402) 
(240) 
(100) 
( 220) 
( 40) 
(115) 
*Probable turnaround for single car movement - Current turnaround for 
Burlington Northern (BN) 
**Probable turnaround for unit train 
***Turnaround achieved by unit train shippers in Nebraska using Burlington 
Northern 
****Turnaround achieved by unit train shippers in Nebraska using Union Pacific 
*****The Union Pacific has a lower rate rather than a mileage credit which 
works out to about $0.175 per loaded Dile 
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The volume of grain carried depend upon factors other th.cm capacity, 
such as turnaround and the nwnber of cars in serviceable condition. 
Therefore, the total car capacity may be increasing but failing to match 
increases in grain production. 
Turnaround and Public Ownership of Rail Cars 
A major factor contributing to grain car availability is the efficiency 
with which rail cars are used; i.e., turnaround. If the State owned cars 
do not match railroad and elevator turnaround, public provision of rail 
cars will decrease the total grain carrying capacity. Following are some 
problems which will affect turnaround of State controlled cars. 
Efficienty and Equity 
Throughout their history, railroads have been charged with discrimina-
tion against some shippers in the allocation of cars. Through the purchase 
of rail equipment the State could attempt to alleviate this. The State 
will find, however, as the railroads have, that efficiency and equity are 
often mutually exclusive goals. The elevators which are experiencing the 
greatest shortage are also the most expensive to serve, i.e., the small 
or branchline elevators. Through serving these elevators, the State will 
reduce turnaround and increase the net cost per bushel. Thus the State 
wou.ld have to choose between efficiency and equity, between movinq the 
greater volilllle of grain for each dollar invested and serving all the 
elevators in South Dakota. And this would be an extremely difficult 
decision for any public employee. 
Assignment Problems 
The State could assign cars permanently to individual shippers, but 
this would result in a fleet which would be inflexible and unresponsive 
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to changes in demand. And further, a permanent assignment is difficult to 
justify based upon shipper needs. If a shipper would benefit enough to 
merit a permanently assigned State car, he should invest in a private fleet. 
The State could also assign the cars to the railroad's fleet, but this 
would mean the carriers would allocate the cars. And if the cars ever 
returned to South Dakota, the same allocation problems created by the 
railroads in the past would continue. Empty cars could also be assigned 
after each trip but this requires extra handling by the railroads and 
takes extra time, which increases costs. 
Management 
The elevators which have used their fleets the most efficiently have 
hired full time traffic managers. This would also be a requirement for 
the State. A fleet of 1,000 cars would take a minimum staff of three 
people and a high speed computer compatible with the railroads' computers. 
Periods of Surplus Equipment 
The seasonality of grain marketing creates fluctuations in the 
derived demand for transportation services. Some firms have achieved a 
higher level of utilization by co-leasing with shippers with different 
seasonal demand patterns. For example, grain dealers and fertilizer dealers 
occasionally co-lease equipment, and each shipper uses the cars during their 
period of greatest need. Occasionally, a shipper will find the seasonal 
patterns have fluctuated, creating the need for the cars when they are 
assigned to the co-lessee. A private business recognizes that to maximize 
long term profits, an occasional short-term loss may be incurred. But 
considering the political problems that could result if State owned rail 
cars were moving fertilizer during a grain car shortage; it is unlikely 
any public official could advocate a co-lease. 
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Under existing tariff regulations 18 railroads need not accept private 
(State owned) cars during periods of car surpluses. And the significant 
variation in the volume of grain marketed within and between crop years can 
turn car shortages into surpluses. For example, weekly shortages of 
8,000 covered hoppers during October 1976 evaporated into surpluses of 
nearly 5,000 cars per week by the end of 1976. Surpluses also existed 
during most of May through September 1977 (see Table 2). During time of 
surplus equipment, the State would encounter the same dilenuna as the 
other non-rail owners. That is, how do they capitalize on an investment 
which is continuing to incur costs but which cannot be used? In addition, 
cars not in use incur a storage charge if they are stored on a railroad-
owned siding, and many elevators in South Dakota do not ovm their sidings. 
The problem of surplus equipment could be resolved in the short run by 
requiring that publicly owned rail cars be utilized before carrier or 
shipper-supplied equipment. This would minimize the net public cost, 
but as the railroads and elevators became the residual car supplier, 
utilization of their equipment would decrease, making ownership more 
expensive and encouraging an even faster disinvestment for railroads 
and the reduction of shipper investment. Therefore, this would be 
counter-productive to the long run objective that State provision of 
rail cars was designed to achieve. 
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Table 2. Surplus and of the U.S. Rail Car for a 
Seventy Week Period.a 
40-Foot 40-I-'oot 
Narrow Narrow 
Door Covered Door Covered 
Week Box Cars Hopper Week Box Cars Hopper 
9/ 4/76 9, 311 (3,621) 7/77 3,946 (996) 
9/11/76 9,220 (2,623) 4/77 5,284 627 
9/2 6 9,185 (3,980 1/77 5,940 1,955 
10/ 2/76 8,242 (4,017) 6/ 4/77 7 ,8ll 2,577 
10/ 9/76 7,346 (3,919) 6/11/77 8,238 2,020 
10/16/76 3, 673 (8,130) 6/18/77 8,595 386 
10/23/76 3,072 (9,142) 6/25/77 8,302 705 
10/30/76 3,209 (8,056) 7/ 2/77 7,912 1,486 
11/ 6/76 2,740 (7,261) 7/ 9/77 6,318 (32) 
11/13/76 6,329 (5,671) 7/16/77 5,140 (62) 
11/20/76 7,509 (3,848) 7/23/77 3,773 (1,415) 
11/27/76 9,500 ( 1, l 04) 7/30/77 3,024 (1,035) 
12/ 4/76 10,923 1,463 8/ G/77 2,656 (1,050) 
12/11/76 ll, 129 2,800 8/13/77 2,251 (543) 
12/18/76 11,805 4,884 8/20/77 3,121 41 
12/2 12,996 5,216 7/77 3 t 129 1,098 
1/ 1/77 12,734 5,279 9/ 3/77 3,706 1,935 
1/ 8/77 11, 695 2,641 9/10/77 3,542 949 
1/15/77 10,700 (835) 9/17/77 3,030 (897) 
1/22/77 7,980 (3,624) 9/24/77 2,202 (2,052) 
1/29/77 3,714 (7,291) 10/ 1/77 1,246 (4,111) 
2/ 1,433 (9,666) 10/ 8/77 462 (,1,647) 
2/12/77 (l,053) (12,140) 10/15/77 175 (3,753) 
2/19/77 (1,722) (11,957) 10/22/77 ( 269) (6,836) 
2/26/77 (2,213) (10,050) 10/29/77 (8 37) (8,145) 
3/ 5/77 (2,924 (11,433) 11/ 5/77 (1,157) (9 I 796) 
2/77 (2,479) (11, 381) 11/12/77 (1,226) (9,100) 
3/19/77 (1,550) (10,839) 11/19/77 (1,255) (9,215) 
3/26/77 (1, 042) (9,246) 11/26/77 (1,202) (7,464) 
4/ 2/77 (l,028) (8 I 321) 12/ 3/77 (1,851) (7,186) 
4/ 9/77 (817) (7, 396) 12/10/77 (1,655) (6,947) 
4/16/77 (301) (6,994) 12/17/77 (1,512) (7,068) 
4/23/77 (1,018) (5,921) 12/24/77 (1,353) (7,182) 
4/30/77 1,445 (4,378 1/77 (1,273) (6,865) 
asource: North Dakota Public Service Commission, "Prelininary Report 
on Feasibility of State of North Dakota Acquiring a Covered 
Hopper Rail Fleet," Bismarck, North Dakota, November 1978. 
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Provi:;ion 
In spite of potential management difficulties or operating costs, 
the critical issue in determining if the State should purchase rail cars, 
is the long-run impact. Will public provision increase the total 
of rail cars available for South Dakota grain shippers, or could the 
supply actually be decreased over time? The answer is dependent upon the 
expected behavior or response of existing car owners including railroads 
and elevators. 
If one assumes that public investment will have no impact upon 
either private investment or car allocation, the additional investor 
would increase the total car supply and relieve a portion of the cost 
imposed by shortages. Unfortunately, this is an unlikely outcome for 
several reasons. First, limited capac exists for building rail cars, 
and delivery usually varies from between one and two years. Therefore, 
the total number of cars which can be manufactured will not increase with 
State purchase, and an investment would simply delay delivery to 
private purchasers. And secondly, it does not consider the economic 
incentives for either the railroad or elevators which own or lease cars. 
If, on the other hand, one assumes that the railroads and 
will adopt behavior in response to the newly created economic 
institution and incentives, the effective increase in the total supply of 
rail cars will be far less than the State's total se. In fact, 
it is possible that if the State purchases rail cars, the long term 
impact will be to reduce the number of cars available to move grain. 
This scenario, which assumes a response current car o~Tiers 
to the economic and political incentive, is moreover, the probable 
outcome. 
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Railroads have existed in a hiqhly regulated environment for many 
years and have learned to make calculated decisions based upon the 
response they expect from the public sector. In fact, railroads are 
often accused of strategic manipulation in other decision making processes 
such as branchline abandonment cases. 19 These allegations, however, are 
simply charges that the railroads are attempting to maximize profits 
within the existing institutional parameter, and there is little reason 
to expect them to alter their profit-maximizing behavior when planning 
car investment. The continuing low rate of return to car ownership 
provides no incentive for the railroads to purchase additional cars or 
even to maintain the existing fleet. Presently the opportunity cost of 
capital dictates that railroads disinvest in rail cars and utilize the 
capital for other purposes, very non-rail investment. 
A change in the rules of the game will encourage railroads to adopt 
further strategic behavior. If they believe that States will purchase 
rail cars, they will adopt a strategy designed to create additional need 
to justify further public investment. This could be accomplished by: 
(1) continuation of railroads' disinvestment policy of the past many 
decades; and, (2) reassigning cars to other states not purchasing rail 
cars. Past rules governing allocation would encouraye tl1is because 
nearby states would initially have more unfilled car orders. 
The other major source of grain cars is the elevators, which have 
become unwilling investors in response to the railroad's disinvestment. 
Access to rail cars is profitable for grain elevators because greater 
net returns can be secured in rail-based markets. But because of rail 
disinvestment, carrier-supplied cars are not readily available, and many 
elevators have responded by purchasing or leasing cars. I!owever, mileage 
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credits do not offset lease costs, and consequently the rail cars themselves 
result in a net cost. Thus while access to rail cars is profitable for 
elevators, access to someone else's car is more profitable than a private 
fleet, and elevators prefer to eliminate their investment. This situation 
provides elevators with the incentive to also adopt strategic behavior 
and attempt to induce someone else to purchase rail equipment, in this 
situation, the State. 
The ultimate strategy which would be adopted by elevators is, however 
more difficult to project. They have more to lose if rail cars are 
unavailable, but they also have better access to decision-making process, 
which encourages strateqic behavior. It is likely that as long as shippers 
believe that a potential public investment might be forthcoming, private 
investment will be discouraged and delayed. Shippers will also actively 
encourage public investment through lobbying and news releases. This 
necessitates a prompt and forceful decision because as long as the 
decision remains unresolved or private investors perceive an irresolute 
decision, they will delay additional rail car purchases. 
Because public investment discourages private investment, once the 
State has initiated a fleet, continuing pressures will exist to expand the 
public fleet as private owners disinvest. Of course, one can argue that 
the State can purchase perhaps 1,000 cars and announce that it is a one-
time transaction, never to be repeated. This is simply round two of game 
theory. In round three, most shippers probably would believe further 
public pressure could force another round of State investment and then 
another. 
lG 
The exact outcome is difficul~ to quantify without estimating supply 
and demand functions. However, there is no doubt that in the short-run, 
the increase in the total supply of grain cars will be significantly less 
than the nwnber of cars the State purchc1sed. This is because of the 
strategic behavior adopted by elevators and railroads in response to the 
new incentives. 
A Decrease in the Supply of Rail Cars 
It is possible, under some conditions, that by purchasing rail cars 
the State would actually decrease the supply which is available to move 
grain. Should private investors believe that additional public purchases 
are possible, the long-term impact could actually be a reduction in cars 
available as private interests attempt to "force" additional public 
investment. Elevators could reduce the number of cars they own or plan 
to own in a greater nwnber than the State buys which would decrease the 
available supply. 
Secondly, the total supply of rail car capacity is a function of 
the number of cars and the turnaround. Earlier, several factors were 
identified which suggested turnaround for State owned cars could be 
less than for privately rnmed cars. A decrease in turnaround ainounts 
to reduced capacity available to move grain. And thirdly, railroads 
could shift cars to other states. 
Should each of these probable outcomes occur, the long-term iQpact 
would be a net decrease in the number of cars available to move grain 
in the State making the car purchase. 
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The fact that the net increas0 in cars is less than the total State 
purchase of cars yields interesting economic results. Normal accoL1nting 
practices would divide the total cost of owning the rail fleet by the 
bushels of grain moved to determine the State's cost per bushel.and 
measure the effectiveness of the State investment. This would under-
estimate the actual additional cost per bushel. The net cost per bushel 
of the State car purchasH :;~ould be determined by dividing the total cost 
of the State fleet by the nwnber of bushels moved in excess of the grain 
which would have moved without the State purchase. If the net additional 
car capacity is significantly less than the State's total acquisition, 
the cost of moving the additional grain becomes rather large. 
Summary: Impact of Public Provision Upon Car Supply 
The agricultural citizenry of various states are seeking the assistance 
of the public sector to resolve the rail equipment shortage. They are 
proposing that State governments purchase rail cars to supplement railroad 
and elevator fleets. An analysis of the economic environment and the 
institutional incentives suggest that State acquisition of rail cars 
would have little positive impact upon the total supply in the long-run. 
And it is very likely that the incentives generated could result in a 
decrease in the total supply. This also results in an extremely high 
cost for the additional bushels of grain moved. The reasons that State 
ownership of rail cars would prove both costly and ineffective is that this 
plan addresses only the symptoms and does not treat the causes. The State 
does have some viable alternatives available which would address the causes 
and increase car supply, and stabilize demand. These are identified in the 
next section. 
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Supply Side Modifications 
Currently rental rates in the form of per diem, demurrage, and 
shipping rates are administered at a level below ownership costs. A 
market transaction would increase the return to car ownership and would 
thereby encourage additional investment. 
A second vehicle which has proven effective in increasing the supply 
of rail cars is collective action between various elevators. In some 
instances the purchase of rail cars has been included in an overall 
cooperative effort such as building a subterminal. In other cases the 
only collective action effort has been to acquire and manage a cooperative 
fleet of rail cars. But in spite of its success, collective action 
has not become a widely adopted strategy in South Dakota because of 
information limitations and organization costs. Thus a vehicle which would 
encourage and facilitate the various cooperative, private, and line 
elevators in collectively purchasing and managing a rail car fleet could 
reduce the equipment shortage problem. One alternative would be to establish 
a rail car expert within the State Department of Transportation. This 
individual would have the needed information regarding all aspects of car 
leases including cost and risk and could function as the vehicle through 
which organizational efforts could proceed. But this institutional 
arrangement would, of course, reinforce the railroads' current disinvestment 
strategy. 
Demand Side Modifications 
When grain prices are high, or during harvest season, car shortages 
exist, while at other times, rail cars stand idle. Thus the temporal 
allocation of demand is critical to effective utilization. Felton has 
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suggested a rail car market in which potential users could bid for 
railroad equipment. 2 0 In addition to encouraging additional invest~ent 
on the supply side, this would allocate equipment more effectively and 
partially eliminate the problems of seasonal demand variation, non-
compensatory per diem and demurrage rates, allocation among shippers, and 
the decrease in utilization. Other institutions which would prove 
effective in allocating demand temporally include flexible rail rates 
and seasonal rates. Should variable rates be implemented, risk will 
increase for elevators because as they contract grain for future delivery 
they cannot lock in a transportation rate. Therefore, elevator margin 
will widen unless a futures market in transportation service is developed 
to protect elevators against transportation risk. Wider margins would 
be borne by the farmer. 
However, the volume of grain requiring transportation is too volatile 
to suggest that these marginal changes would be completely effective in 
allocating demand over time. While domestic demand for grain is relatively 
stable over time, export demand fluctuates greatly in response to various 
factors such as weather-generated shortfalls of grain in other countries, 
embargoes, and other foreign policy, and policies of other nations, among 
other factors. Each time export, and thus domestic, ces delcine, 
farmers react by reducing the volume they are willing to sell and increasing 
the amount they store. As part of its food policy, the public sector 
responds by making on-farm storage easier. Both construction and carrying 
charges are subsidized. But when ces improve, an even larger volume 
of grain will require transportation, which compounds car shortages and 
creates even larger transportation bottlenecks. And again, a public 
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policy designed to assist a segment of the citizenry generates behavior 
which yields a suboptimal performance and perhaps even a destructive 
performance. It should be noted that on-farm storage which allocates 
grain over the marketing year contributes to the orderly utilization 
of rail cars. On-farm storage which enables farmers to store production 
from more than one crop year compounds the cyclical nature of grain 
marketing and compounds car allocation problems. 
To prevent this build-up of grain reserves at the point of production 
and therefore stabilize the demand for transportation services, an 
institutional modification is necessary which allows the deployment of 
grain to potential markets while the farmer retains control and ownership. 
Direct farmer ownership of storage facilities at ports would achieve this 
objective. Individual farmers, acting collectively, would build storage 
facilities near a port with some type of transfer to the export houses. 
Their grain would be shipped via the normal mode, mixed with grain of 
others, to this storage facility during periods of low prices. When an 
individual was ready to sell, he would issue instructions to the facility 
manger to deliver the grain to an export house. Obviously this suggestion 
is plagued with numerous problems, including: (1) potential managerial 
difficulties, (2) liability claims for transit or storage damage, (3) 
unwillingness of local elevators to load farmer-owned grain, (4) lack of 
physical control by farmers, (5) the higher construction, land, and tax 
costs at an urban facility. Finally, on-farm storage costs are perceived 
to be much less than they actually are, which perceptually make off-farm 
storage comparatively less favorable. While this institutional 
arrangement - direct farmer ownership of storage facilities - is plagued 
with problems, the potential benefits justify further exploration. The 
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public sector could play a critical role in facilitating collective action 
and providing information. Existing agricultural and food programs and 
tax laws would also need to be modified before off-farm storage could 
materialize. The exact that direct farmer ownership of storage 
facilities at ports would have upon the agricultural production and 
marketing sectors and the effective utilization of limited resources is 
unclear and needs further analysis. Existing agricultural policy and 
tax laws which encourage investment in farm facilities beyond 
one year's crop are probably going to compound the rail car 
over time. 
and Conclusion 
The State is correct that public intervention is necessary to modify 
the and demand for rail cars. Rather than additional restrictions 
upon the market, however, the key is a solution based upon a minimum of 
administrative proceedings and a maximum of institutional incentives designed 
to induce investment. Because of the various economic incentives, State 
provision of rail cars will induce strategic behavior by railroads and 
Their response will be a reduced investment in rail cars, 
counteracting the State funding. The exact impact upon the total or the 
marginal supply is indeterminant, but the increase in will be 
ficantly less than the total number of cars acquired by the State. 
And possibly, the net would be a decrease in the total supply of 
rail cars. State action which would encourage collective action amony 
the various elevators and increase the available information would likely 
have a more permanent and positive effect. To resolve the problem, it is 
necessary to modify the institutions which have created the existing situation. 
Only then will an adequate fleet of cars be available to transport grain 
produced in South Dakota. 
22 
l. \v. H. Thompson and C. P. Bawnel., "Impact of Transportation 
Equipment Shortages on Iowa Country Elevators,'' Transportation 
Journal, Fall 1972, Volume 12, #1, p. 51. 
2. Frank N. Wilner, Preliminary Report on Feasibility of State of 
North Dakota Acquiring a Covered lloj?per Rail Fleet, North Dakota 
Public Service Commission, November 1974, Bismarck, North Dakota, 
p. 43. 
3. John Richard Felton, The Utilization and Adequacy of the Freight 
Car Fleet, Land Economics, Vol. XLVII, #3, August 1971, p. 267, 
4. Transportation, Report of the Joint Commission of Agricultural 
Inquiry, House of Representatives, G7th Congress, First Session, 
Report 408, Part 3, October 15, 1921, as reported in Robert 
Tosterud and David C. Nelson, A Study of the Box and Hopper Car 
Supply Problems in the United States, Upper Great Plains Trans-
portation Institute, Paper #10, September 1969, Fargo, North 
Dakota, p. 4. 
5. William J. Hudson, AS of Conditions A 
of Railroad U.S. Department of 
p, reported Tosterud and Nelson, p. 4. 
6. Association of l..merican Railroads: Yearbook of Railroad Facts, 
1980, AAR, Washington, D.C., p. 20. 
7. Erhardt 0, Rupprecht, "Demand for Freight Cars in the Movements 
of Grains," Paper presented at the annual AAEA meeting, August 15, 
1976, p. l. 
8. c. Phillip Baumel, Thomas P. Drinka, Dennis R. Lifferth and 
John J. Millers. ~A~n:._.:::.::..=..;.::..:=:;:::.;::_::r~,n~a;;.;:: _ _!_;:.~:::..;::.__::...c........;..:.~:..::..::.:..:..:.:..;;..__:.__:......::....~.....,;_ 
Transportation Systems: A Case Study, Report No. 
prepared for the Federal Railroad Administration, Springfield, 
Virginia: National Technical Information Service, 1973. 
9. Roger Jones, "Another Nail in the Railroad Coffin," Transportation 
Research, Pergamon Press, Elmsford, N.Y., Volu~e 7, #4, DeceITber 1973. 
10. Public Law 94-210, Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform 
Act of 1976, 94th Congress, 52718, February 5, 1976. 
11. Robert J. Tosterud and David c. Nelson, AS of the Rox and 
Hopper Car Supply Problems in the U:1ited States, Upper Great 
Plains Transportation Institute Paper No. 10, Fargo, North Dakota, 
September 1969. 
23 
12. Yehuda Grunfeld, "'l'he Effect of the Per Diem Rate on the 
Efficiency and Size of the limerican Railroad Freight Car Fleet," 
of January 1959, pp. 56-57. 
13. The Association of American Railroads instituted a multilevel 
per diem rate on January 1, 1964. 
14. Baumel et al., p. 100. 
15. American Association of Railroads, p. 49. 
16. Ibid, p. 49. 
17. Ibid, p. 50. 
18. Association of American Railroads OT-5. 
19. It would indeed be unfortunate for those who consider themselves 
victims of present railroad manipulative behavior to design new 
institutions which would encourage further behavior of a similar 
nature! 
20. Felton, p. 272. 
